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A Puzzle for Social Essences 
ABSTRACT. The social world contains institutions (nations, clubs), 
groups (races, genders), objects (talismans, borders), and more. 
This paper explores a puzzle about the essences of social items. 
There is widespread consensus against social essences because of 
problematic presuppositions often made about them. But it is 
argued that essence can be freed from these presuppositions and 
their problems. Even so, a puzzle still arises. In a Platonic spirit, 
essences in general seem “detached” from the world. In an 
Aristotelian spirit, social essences in particular seem “embedded” 
in the world. The puzzle is that these inclinations are individually 
plausible but jointly incompatible. The paper has four aims: to 
clarify and refine the puzzle; to explore the puzzle’s implications 
for essence in general and for social essences in particular; to 
illustrate the fruitfulness of the general distinction between 
“detached” and “embedded”; and to develop this distinction to 
sketch a novel solution to the puzzle. 
KEYWORDS: social metaphysics, essence, ground   
 Overview 
The social world contains items of many kinds, including but not 
limited to institutions (nations, clubs), groups (races, genders), and 
objects (talismans, borders). This paper explores a puzzle about the 
essences of social items.1  
 
1 Thanks to audiences at the 2020 Social Metaphysics Workshop, the 2018 Social 
Ontology Conference, the 2015 Metaphysics Workshop “Artifacts and 
Metaphysical Explanation”, LOGOS (University of Barcelona), Union College, 
University of Victoria, University of Washington, as well as to Matthew Andler, 
Kit Fine, Anthony Fisher, Martin Glazier, Aaron Griffith, Eric Hochstein, 
Katharine Jenkins, Kathrin Koslicki, Colin Marshall, Rebecca Mason, Conor Mayo-
Wilson, Asya Passinsky, Dee Payton, Kevin Richardson, Cliff Roberts, Alex Skiles, 
Katie Stockdale, and anonymous referees and editors for their advice. Research for 
this paper was supported by a SSHRC Insight Grant “The Essence of Anti-
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 Some may already find it puzzling to associate social items 
with essences. Since antiquity, essences played important but 
controversial explanatory roles in philosophical and scientific 
theorizing. In recent times, the most controversial application of 
essence has been to social items. It was once common to investigate 
social items by investigating their essences or natures. On this 
approach, discovering what a nation, gender, or border is involves 
discovering the essence of a nation, gender, or border. The approach, 
however, was often entangled with problematic presuppositions 
about what these essences had to be. It was once presupposed, for 
example, that the essences of gender had to be biological. There is 
now widespread consensus that this presupposition, and others like 
it, are unscientific, philosophically unjustified, and socially unjust. 
This has driven many to reject social essences. Accordingly, recent 
discussions of essences seldom mention social items. Their focus 
tends to be elsewhere: on sets essentially having their members, 
persons or material objects essentially having their origins, water 
essentially being H20, and the like. And when social essences are 
discussed, it is often to deride them as harmful vestiges of 
unscientific and unjust ideologies.  
Nevertheless, much of the resistance toward social essences is 
misplaced. There are compelling reasons to believe that the 
problematic presuppositions are dispensable. Essence can be freed 
from them and the problems they induce. The residual notion of 
essence is compatible with good science and social progress. The 
essences of social items may then be regarded as no less worthy of 
serious inquiry than the essences of sets and the like. If there is a real 
surprise here, then it is the prospect of learning from essence’s 
application to a domain so often thought to be inhospitable to it. 
But there is another threat to this prospect. It originates in the 
general question of where essence “resides”. Two approaches have 
endured since antiquity. The first, “Platonic” approach regards 
essences as somehow detached from the world. It’s as if essences are 
given prior to their worldly manifestations, as with Plato’s Forms. 
 
Essentialism” (with Kathrin Koslicki), the Canadian Metaphysics Collaborative, 
and University of Victoria Humanities Faculty Fellowship. 
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The second, “Aristotelian” approach regards essences as somehow 
embedded in the world. Essences are as much a part of the world as 
their worldly manifestations, as with Aristotle’s universals. 
The two approaches conflict. Their conflict, in its most 
abstract form, is generated by three claims: an essentialist claim that 
essences of a certain sort exist; an embedded claim that these essences 
are embedded in the world; and a detached claim that these essences 
are detached from the world. The embedded and detached claims 
are meant to capture the Aristotelian and Platonic approaches. They 
wouldn’t conflict if there were no essences of the relevant sort. But 
the essentialist claim entails that there are.  
 The conflict would not raise any puzzle were there not 
competing inclinations to regard some essences as both embedded 
and detached. But the competing inclinations are present, at least in 
some cases. They are perhaps strongest in the case of social items. In 
the Aristotelian spirit, not only do we construct social items, we also 
may seem to construct their natures. Clubs, genders, and borders did 
not predate us. We made them. And, it may seem, we made them 
what they are. It is, for example, essential to a border that it 
demarcates a nation’s land. It is so because, somehow, we made it 
so. The essential fact about borders seems embedded in worldly facts 
about our institutions, needs, interests, and practices. But in the 
Platonic spirit, the essences of things do not seem up to us. Essences 
are like definitions or axioms. Even if we might adopt different 
definitions or axioms for different purposes, it is not as if we can 
change what the definitions or axioms are. Nor can we determine 
what the very natures of things are. Essences seem detached from 
any worldly grounds. Now we seem to have a puzzle. It is that we 
have conflicting inclinations to regard social essences as at once 
embedded in but detached from the world.  
The paper has four aims. One aim is to clarify the puzzle. This 
involves refining the key notions (essence, detached, embedded) 
used to state it. These notions are of general interest apart from their 
application to social items. But I will focus on that application here.  
A second aim is to explore the puzzle’s implications. The 
puzzle, once refined, is surprisingly resilient. Engaging with it 
4/31 
promises to be of interest for what it teaches us about social essences 
in particular. But it also promises to be of broader interest. This is 
because it is a vivid case study of the general conflict between the 
Aristotelian and Platonic approaches to essences.  
A third aim is to illustrate the fruitfulness of an unfamiliar 
distinction between facts, or truths. On the one hand, there are 
worldly facts that hold because of the circumstances. On the other 
hand, there are unworldly facts that hold regardless of the 
circumstances. This distinction concerns whether or not a fact is based 
in worldly circumstances, and so I call it the basal distinction. 
Elsewhere I have discussed the basal distinction at length and 
argued that it is of general interest apart from any of its potential 
applications (Raven 2021a). But it gains further interest for its 
potential applications, such as to the philosophy of logic (Raven 
2020a). The basal distinction, as we will see, helps refine the puzzle. 
It does so by refining the notions of detached and embedded. This 
illustrates how the distinction applies to essence and social 
metaphysics.  
The final aim of the paper is to show how the distinction 
provides for a novel potential solution to the puzzle. The solution 
uses the basal distinction. Properly developing that distinction 
involves sorting through intricacies beyond the scope of this paper. 
That means my presentation of the solution here won’t go beyond 
an outline. In particular, I will not argue for the solution or defend it 
against its main objections. My more modest aim is to add it to the 
list of options. Still, the solution should be of interest not only as a 
solution to the puzzle, but also as a blueprint for reconciling conflicts 
between the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches in other contexts. 
The paper is in three parts. The first part formulates the 
puzzle and the three claims generating it (§1). The second part 
explores these three claims in more detail and offers support for each 
(§§2-4). The third and final part sketches a solution to the puzzle that 
makes crucial appeal to the basal distinction (§5).  
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 The Puzzle 
The general form of the puzzle consists in three individually 
plausible but jointly inconsistent claims: an essentialist claim, an 
embedded claim, and a detached claim. My aim in this section is to 
give a clear formulation of the puzzle for the case of social items. 
Here my immediate concern is just to clarify these claims. I will later 
consider how they might be motivated and defended.  
 The first claim is the essentialist claim. Some facts about social 
items seem inessential or accidental. To illustrate, suppose that 
Congress, women (the generic kind), and the Korean DMZ are social 
items. Then examples of inessential facts about them might include: 
I1  Congress has 535 voting members. 
I2  Women may vote. 
I3  The Korean DMZ is a wildlife haven. 
Other facts about social items seem essential or non-accidental. 
Uncontroversial examples are not always easy to find. But we may 
suppose, if only for illustration, that examples might include:  
E1  Congress is bicameral. 
E2  Women are oppressed as women. 
E3  The Korean DMZ is unfortified. 
The essentiality of these facts is stated by essentialist facts. These are: 
S1  Congress is essentially bicameral. 
S2  Women are essentially oppressed as women. 
S3  The Korean DMZ is essentially unfortified. 
Atomic essentialist facts have the form x is essentially F.  
 It is important to distinguish between facts having the status 
of being essential (E1-3) and facts reporting this status (S1-3). One 
reason to distinguish these is to allow for explanatory relations 
between them. For example, one might wish to say that Congress is 
bicameral (E1) because it is essentially bicameral (S1). If this 
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explanatory claim is to have its intended significance, then S1 and E1 
must be distinct. I will return to this distinction later. 
Our focus will be on essentialist facts about social items, such 
as S1-S3. We may call these social-essentialist facts. And we may then 
express the claim that essentialist facts about social items exist as: 
Social-Essentialism  There are social-essentialist facts. 
This is the essentialist claim used in generating our puzzle. The claim 
needs qualifications. They will be made when it is defended later. 
 The second and third claims are the detached and embedded 
claims. These are best characterized together. This is because they 
take opposing views of a contrast between essences being detached 
from or embedded in the world.  
 This contrast, or something near enough, has a venerable 
history. Perhaps its most traditional characterization was in terms of 
transcendence and immanence. On the Platonic approach, essences 
were thought to somehow transcend their worldly instances. By 
contrast, the Aristotelian approach took essences to be somehow 
immanent in their worldly instances.  
 My inclination, however, is not to characterize our contrast in 
the traditional way. One reason for this is that it adds excess 
baggage. Transcendence and immanence, as they are often 
understood, apply to items of some sort. If essences are universals, 
then it is items of this sort—universals—that are transcendent or 
immanent. Or if essences are particulars, such as haecceities, then it 
is items of that sort—haecceities—that are transcendent or 
immanent. Either way involves reifying essences one way or 
another. But the reification is unnecessary and undesirable. It is 
unnecessary because essentialist claims needn’t be about essences. 
For example, in accepting that Socrates is essentially human, we 
might only accept something about the mode of his being human. We 
needn’t thereby reify any essence. Of course, we may go on to do so, 
if we wish. But the point is that our essentialist claims do not require 
this. That makes the reification undesirable for being unnecessary.  
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 We want to characterize the contrast between detached and 
embedded without reifying essences. One way is to give the 
characterization directly in terms of the essentialist facts themselves. 
This might seem to replace one reification—of essences—with 
another—of facts. And it might be doubted whether this replacement 
is beneficial. If indeed there is such a replacement, it might be argued 
that the reification of facts is less problematic than the reification of 
essences. One might argue, for example, that anyone is or ought to 
recognize the existence of facts whatever their views on essence 
might be. But it might also be argued that the appearance of a 
replacement is not genuine. My talk of facts is, ultimately, a useful 
convenience that can be translated with minimal distortion into fact-
free talk. We may, for example, translate explicit fact-talk, such as 
‘the fact that Congress is essentially bicameral’, into fact-free talk 
about truths, such as ‘the truth that Congress is essentially 
bicameral’. Or we may translate it into fact-free and truth-free talk, 
such as, ‘Congress is essentially bicameral’. Translations like, while 
inconvenient, are available. Their availability ensures that indulging 
in fact-talk shouldn’t create new problems later.   
 Our approach characterizes facts as detached or embedded. 
We may say that whether a fact is detached or embedded is 
determined by its basal status. To a first approximation, the basal 
status of a fact concerns the basis for its obtaining. Does the fact hold 
because of the circumstances? If so, it has a basis in the world. It is a 
worldly (or circumstantial) fact, and so is embedded. Or does the fact 
hold regardless of the circumstances? If so, it does not have a worldly 
basis. It is an unworldly (or acircumstantial) fact, and so is detached.  
 We may illustrate the intended contrast by example. Consider 
the following claim about Trump: 
T  Trump tweets. 
This is a worldly fact. A telltale sign is how T’s obtaining is based on 
worldly circumstances, such as the time. We may sensibly ask 
whether Trump was tweeting or is now tweeting or will tweet. And 
the answer will depend, accordingly, on the past or present or future 
ircumstances. By contrast, consider the arithmetical claim: 
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Z  Zero is even. 
This is an unworldly fact. A telltale sign is how Z’s obtaining is not 
based on worldly circumstances, such as the time. It does not seem 
that we may sensibly ask whether zero was even or is now even or 
will be even. Or, at least, if there is any sense to these questions, it is 
only by contorting the original sense almost beyond recognition.  
It is tempting to try to assimilate the basal distinction to more 
familiar distinctions. One might, for instance, attempt to assimilate 
it to the semantic distinction between analyticity and syntheticity, or 
the epistemic distinction between apriority and aposteriority, or the 
modal distinction between necessity and contingency, or various 
other distinctions. Elsewhere I have argued at length against such 
attempts at assimilation (Raven 2020a,2021a). Their failure, however, 
does not require denying potential implications between the basal 
distinction and the other distinctions. But it does undermine the 
expectation for an analysis of it in terms of them. I therefore propose 
exploring the basal distinction’s applications without first 
demanding an analysis of it. This does not rule out the possibility of 
an analysis later. For now, we will clarify the distinction by its uses.  
Our first use of the basal distinction will be to help 
characterize our theses of embedded and detached. They are:  
Embedded Social essentialist facts are worldly. 
Detached  Essentialist facts are unworldly. 
Now the joint inconsistency of our three claims is evident. Social-
Essentialism implies that there are facts about social essences. 
Embedded implies that they are worldly, whereas Detached implies 
that they are unworldly. But no fact can be both. So we have a 
contradiction.  
 Of course, that some claims are inconsistent needn’t itself be 
puzzling. What makes their inconsistency puzzling is, as we will 
soon see, that each claim is individually plausible. That is our puzzle.    
 This puzzle has analogues in other domains. For example, 
analogous considerations support essentialist, embedded, and 
detached claims for a puzzle about artifacts. Indeed, the analogies 
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may extend even further to what I call constructed items. These are 
items constructed or produced by us, including but not limited to 
social items and artifacts. It seems we may adapt the considerations 
above to generate a puzzle for constructed items in general.  
Recognizing the potential extensions of our puzzle illustrates 
its broad interest. But just how forceful the puzzle is will be domain-
specific: it will wax and wane with how plausible the generating 
claims are in a given domain. I will focus on the social domain 
because it is among the most forceful. Arguing for this will occupy 
the next few sections. My aim is to argue that each claim generating 
the puzzle is individually plausible. That is not to say that they are 
all true. But given that the claims jointly conflict, their individual 
plausibility will be enough to establish that our puzzle is indeed 
puzzling.   
 Social-Essentialism  
Doubts about Social-Essentialism arise before the puzzle does, which 
may only reinforce the puzzle. But before engaging these doubts, it 
is worth noting just how concessive we may be. For we may explore 
what the essences of social items would be were they to have 
essences, even while bracketing whether they really do. This 
exploration isn’t idle. It should interest friends and foes of essences 
alike because it promises to clarify what friends accept and foes 
reject.  
 We needn’t, however, remain so concessive. For many of the 
common doubts about social essences are not compelling. Some of 
them derive from confusions about what Social-Essentialism entails. 
These may be dispelled with a few qualifications.  
The first qualification is that Social-Essentialism does not 
specify just which social-essentialist facts there are. Perhaps they 
include some or all of S1-S3. Or perhaps not. Of course, it would be 
nice to know just which social-essentialist facts there are. But Social-
Essentialism itself only says there are some without specifying which. 
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This dispels any doubts about Social-Essentialism making the wrong 
predictions about which social-essentialist facts there are.  
 The second qualification is that Social-Essentialism is silent on 
the source of the social-essentialist facts. Perhaps they are conferred 
on items by us. Or perhaps we somehow construct them. Or perhaps 
they were generated by natural processes. Or perhaps they obtain in 
a Platonic realm. Or perhaps some have one source while others have 
another. Or perhaps they have no source. Of course, it would be nice 
to know just what, if any, the sources of the social-essentialist facts 
are. But Social-Essentialism itself is neutral on this. This dispels any 
doubts about Social-Essentialism making the wrong predictions about 
the sources of social-essentialist facts.  
 Other skeptical doubts about Social-Essentialism are not so 
easily dispelled. There are three main kinds. The first doubts the 
existence of social items. The second doubts essence in general. And 
the third doubts the application of essence to social items in 
particular.  
 First, one might reject social essences by rejecting social items. 
This is not merely to say that they do not fundamental exist or exist in 
reality. It is the stronger view that they do not exist at all. There are 
no nations, clubs, races, genders, talismans, or borders. This may be 
combined with the assumption that there are essential facts about 
social items only if social items exist. If so, then nihilism implies that 
Social-Essentialism is false. I will, however, just assume that social 
items exist. This is justified by the sheer obviousness of their 
existence, however controversial it may be just which there are, what 
they are, how we know of them, and so on. Of course, the nihilist 
won’t be impressed by the charge that they deny the obvious. But 
the rest of us will see just how desperate and incredible it would be 
to avoid the puzzle by rejecting Social-Essentialism. 
 Second, one might reject social essences in particular because 
one rejects essences in general. Although there is a venerable 
tradition locating essence at the core of metaphysics, there is a 
competing tradition that seeks to sanitize essence, or to eliminate it 
altogether (Quine 1953; Sullivan 2017). In this vein, one might say 
that social items in particular lack essences because all things in 
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general lack essences. If social items have no essences, then there are 
no essential facts about them. And if so, Social-Essentialism is false. 
But the question of whether it is legitimate to appeal to essence in 
general reaches far beyond our immediate concern with our puzzle. 
Earlier I suggested that our puzzle brings into sharp relief the 
conflict between Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to essence. 
One could take the puzzle to bear on essence in general if one took 
these approaches to be both obligatory while unavoidably in conflict. 
But, so far, we have no reason to expect this outcome. And so it seems 
we may, at least provisionally, insulate our puzzle from its potential 
impact on essence in general. In this spirit, I will assume that the 
appeal to essence in general is legitimate. 
 Third, one might reject social essences in particular because it 
may seem as if essence cannot be properly applied to social items. In 
this vein, it is sometimes argued that metaphysical frameworks 
using notions like structure, ground, fundamentality, and essence 
are inhospitable to social metaphysics and feminist metaphysics 
(Barnes 2014; Mikkola 2015, with replies from Schaffer 2017; Sider 
2017). It must be conceded that some of these frameworks—or at least 
the rhetoric used to motivate them—may indeed be inhospitable. But 
this is not to concede that all frameworks are inhospitable. And some 
argue that other frameworks are, indeed, hospitable after all (Raven 
2017: §§3.2-3.3; Passinsky 2020a,2021; Mason 2021). At the very least, 
the application of essence to social items is on the cards. 
 Even if the application is on the cards in principle, it may still 
seem illicit in practice. To illustrate, consider the especially 
challenging case of gender. It was once common to assume that 
genders were essentially biological. But this is now widely rejected 
for being unjustified and unjust. While controversies remain over 
whether science supports sex being biological (Dupré 1993; Nanay 
2010; Wilson, Matthew, and Brigandt 2007), there is a broad 
consensus that it does not support gender being biological. Nor is 
there any plausible apriori justification for it either. What’s more, 
social theorists have unmasked how the assumption can lead to 
various injustices (de Beauvoir 1984; Butler 1988; Cornell 1993; Lorde 
1984; Schor and Weed 1994; Spelman 1988).  
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What lesson should we infer from this case? Many would 
infer that the application of essence to gender is illicit. But the 
inference is fallacious. It just does not follow that genders have no 
essence from their having no biological essence (Witt 1995; Mason 
2016). A better lesson is that genders do not have biological essences, 
which is compatible with their having essences of another sort. In 
general, cases like this one rely on transferring doubts about bad 
views of social essences onto the social essences themselves. But the 
transfer is illicit and should be resisted. As a result, these cases do 
not support doubts about the application of essence to social items.  
 These considerations together suggest that doubts about 
social essences are weaker than they may first seem. The problematic 
presuppositions once foisted upon social essences are, in fact, 
separable from them. Freeing social essences from them reveals their 
compatibility with good science and social progress.  
This result, however, would be of only meager interest were 
the appeal to social essences dispensable. But, while recognizing the 
potential risks of appealing to social essences, it nevertheless 
remains difficult—if not impossible—to do without them entirely. 
There are at least three reasons why.  
  One reason is that there is simply a strong presumption for 
social essences. This is clear from our ability to comprehend and our 
willingness to accept essentialist claims about many social items. We 
have, it seems, no difficulty comprehending and distinguishing 
between inessential claims about social items (I1-I3), essential claims 
about social items (E1-E3), and social-essentialist claims (S1-S3). 
Admittedly, not all examples of social-essentialist claims will be 
uncontroversial. But that is no obstacle to grasping what social 
claims are supposed to be like.   
  A second reason is that social essences would appear to be 
explanatorily and ideologically fruitful (Haslanger 2012b; Witt 2011; 
Passinsky 2021).  Some of their fruitfulness derives from the fruitful 
roles essences play in general. One of these roles is fixing the domain 
(Raven 2021b). When speaking of a chemical kind (gold), a species 
(tigers), or a person (Saul Kripke), we might ask what it is we speak 
of. And we may answer by stating what the essence of the chemical 
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kind, species, or person is. This also holds for the social. To specify a 
social item’s essence is to fix the subject matter.  
 This domain-fixing role feeds into a second role for essence: 
specifying an item’s immutable core. Once we discover the essence of a 
chemical kind, a species, or a person, we thereby learn that it must 
be so if it is to be what it is. It might change some of its inessential 
features and still be what it is. But were its essential features to 
change, it would cease to be what it is. This also holds for the social. 
To specify a social item’s essence is to specify its immutable core.   
 A third role is vindicating certain projects. This involves the 
application of the previous roles to various subject matters. These 
subjects may be topical or even urgent. So there is a sense in which 
the third role may be of more immediate practical interest than the 
first two. But this third role tends to be overlooked or ignored. In any 
case, we may illustrate it by considering two examples.  
 First, consider the question of what a nation (or state) is. It is 
often assumed that it is essential to a nation that it have habitable 
territory (Crawford 2006). But the assumption is controversial. If, for 
example, climate change submerges the Republic of Maldives, will 
recognition of its past landedness sustain its continued existence? 
And landless indigenous nations may already provide 
counterexamples, such as with the formerly landless Little Shell 
Chippewa Tribe (McLaughlin 2019). These issues are important in 
their own right, but also for their impact on urgent legal and moral 
questions concerning the rights of stateless refugees and landless 
peoples (Alexander and Simon 2014a,2014b,2017). And answering 
them seems to involve determining what the essence of a nation is. 
 Second, consider the project of promoting social justice. One 
aim of this project is to clarify what gender oppression is, both to 
understand it and to reduce it. This plainly appeals to essence. The 
aim is to understand what it is to be a man or woman or genderqueer. 
Perhaps the apparent reference to essence can be removed or shown 
to be illusory. But it is unclear how this might be done without 
distorting the project. To illustrate, notice that Haslanger (2014: 31) 
describes one of her projects as “offering a theory of what gender is”. 
Jenkins (2016) objected to Haslanger (2012a)’s theory on the grounds 
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that it wrongly predicted that a trans woman who tends not to pass 
as a cis woman would not be a woman. A plausible construal of their 
debate is as being over the essence of womanhood (Barnes 2014; 
Passinsky 2020a). And so alternative construals risk distorting it. 
What’s more, alternative construals risk undermining the project’s 
goal of social progress. To illustrate, consider the feminist project of 
opposing systematic oppression against women. Making sense of 
this project requires making sense of the target of the oppression 
they oppose. But what is it that is the target of this oppression? To 
answer this is to say what it is to be a woman. And so the feminist 
project seems to presuppose an appeal to essence. Without it, it is 
obscure how feminists could intelligibly formulate the oppression 
they oppose (cf. Heyes 1997).  
 There’s no question that social essences raise many 
challenges. I do not presume to have shown that these challenges can 
all be met. But I have argued that it is no less challenging to dismiss 
social essences outright. And so it seems we should, at least 
provisionally, accept the appearance that there are social essences.  
 Embedded 
Perhaps the main direct support for Embedded builds on the familiar 
idea that social items are socially constructed. It is not just that societies 
construct money, nations, borders, races, and genders. It is also that 
societies construct what they are. The social essences themselves are 
socially constructed. This idea is not often explicitly discussed in the 
literature. Still, one may find suggestive precedents. One relies on 
conceptual stipulations. In this vein, Thomasson (2003b: 588) writes: 
...the principles [regarding sufficient conditions for the existence 
of institutional kinds] accepted play a stipulative role in 
constituting the nature of the kind. 
Another precedent says essences are conferred by conceptual or 
explanatory practices. In the former vein, Ásta (2008: 138) writes: 
My contention here is that the property of being an essential 
property of an object—essentiality—is conferred. I maintain that 
essentiality is conferred by our use of concepts—not by how we 
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as a matter of fact do or have used them, but how we are 
committed to using them. 
In the latter vein, Sullivan (2017) writes: 
A property is only essential to an object relative to an explanatory 
framework, and true essence ascriptions may vary across 
frameworks. …Outside of an explanatory framework, an object’s 
properties can be considered neither essential nor accidental. 
And there are further suggestive precedents as well (Almog 2010; 
Epstein 2015; Passinsky 2020b; Ritchie 2015; Searle 1995, Smith 2001; 
Smith and Varzi 2000; Thomasson 2003a).  
 Some might classify views like these as anti-essentialist. 
Indeed, some of their proponents describe their own views as anti-
essentialist. But we needn’t make heavy weather of our labels here. 
All the preceding views agree that there are essences but take them, 
in one way or another, to be constituted by our activities or practices. 
So they all agree that there are social-essentialist facts and that they 
hold in virtue of various worldly circumstances. That is, they agree 
that social-essentialist facts are worldly. And that just is Embedded. 
 There is also indirect support for Embedded. Earlier I 
distinguished between a fact’s status and the report of its having that 
status. Although the distinction is somewhat unfamiliar, it is also of 
general interest and deserves further clarification. In addition, it has 
a specific application to the present context. It can be leveraged into 
a potential solution to the puzzle that rejects Embedded. But I will 
argue that the solution ultimately fails. Its failure is instructive. It 
indirectly bolsters Embedded as well as the puzzle’s resilience.  
 The status/report distinction relies on a certain notion of a 
fact’s status. This concerns the manner in which the fact obtains. Any 
manner would illustrate the idea. But modality and essence are most 
pertinent. To illustrate, consider Fine (1994: 846)’s famous example 
about Socrates and the singleton set {Socrates} containing him:  
S   Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. 
Now, S is an essential truth about {Socrates}. Following Fine (1994), 
although a necessary truth needn’t be essential, all essential truths 
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are necessary. So S is also a necessary truth. But we may distinguish S 
from reports of its necessity and essentiality:   
S   Necessarily, Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. 
ES   Socrates is essentially a member of {Socrates}. 
Because S is necessarily and essentially true, it is a necessity and an 
essentiality. But S reports neither of these statuses. So it is neither a 
modal nor an essentialist fact. By contrast, S is a modal fact because 
it reports S’s necessity. And ES is an essentialist fact because it reports 
S’s essentiality. In general, we may distinguish facts having the status 
of being necessary or essential (necessities or essentialities, like S) from 
facts reporting this status (necessary facts like S, essentialist facts like 
ES).  
 The status/report distinction may seem unstable. Isn’t what it 
is for S to be necessary just for S to be true? And isn’t what it is for S 
to be essential just for ES to be true? So won’t the distinction collapse?  
 There are, however, powerful reasons supporting the 
distinction’s stability. For one, the distinction emerges in what is said 
at the level of ordinary meaning. None of S, S, or ES could have 
failed to be true. But they differ in what they say. Whereas S reports 
S’s necessity and ES reports S’s essentiality, S itself reports neither. 
The status/report distinction captures these contrasts in what is said.  
The distinction also emerges in disagreements about what 
explains what. In the modal case, we may consider explanatory 
connections between necessities and their prejacents. On the one 
hand, an amodalist aims to reduce modality to regularities across 
possible worlds. Just as instances of a generalization help explain it, 
so too S will help explain S. On the other hand, a modalist is content 
with unreduced modality. They may say that what explains S’s truth 
is that it must be true, i.e. S. The amodalist and modalist disagree 
over whether S helps explain S or vice versa. Their disagreement 
assumes the status/report distinction.   
Analogous considerations also apply to the case of essence. 
To illustrate, consider an essentialist who explains essentialities in 
terms of essentialist facts (Glazier 2017). For example, given that ES 
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obtains, then ES helps explain S. Given that nothing helps explain 
itself, this requires distinguishing between S/ES. And that just is the 
status/report distinction.  
 Although the status/report distinction is of general interest, it 
has a specific application here. It can be leveraged into a solution to 
the puzzle. The original formulation of the puzzle relies on: 
Embedded Social-essentialist facts are worldly. 
This is a report claim. It concerns facts, like S1-S3, reporting various 
essentialities. Embedded says they are worldly. Given the 
status/report distinction, there is also a status claim about the 
corresponding social-essentialities:  
Embedded* Social-essentialities are worldly. 
This concerns facts, like E1-E3, that are essential as to status. 
Embedded* says they are worldly. The status and report claims 
differ. Status facts like E1-E3 concern such worldly matters as 
Congress and bicamerality, women and oppression, the Koreas and 
fortifications. So Embedded* may seem true. But report facts like S1-
S3 concern essence, which is paradigmatically unworldly. So 
Embedded may seem false. The difference between status and report 
claims, however, is subtle enough that they may be confused. In 
particular, it may be alleged that we confused Embedded and 
Embedded* and thereby illicitly projected the latter’s plausibility 
onto the former. But once the confusion is dispelled, we may accept 
Embedded* and reject Embedded. And because Embedded* is 
consistent with Social-Essentialism and Detached, the puzzle 
disappears.  
 But problems arise once we ask how social-essentialities and 
social-essentialist facts are explanatorily connected. Do social-
essentialities help explain social-essentialist facts, social-essentialist 
facts help explain social-essentialities, or neither?  
 The last option is implausible. When a social-essentiality (like 
S1-S3) and its matching social-essentialist fact (like E1-E3) both 
obtain, then one must help explain the other. They are just too 
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intimately related for neither to help explain the other. So let us focus 
on the first two options. 
 On the first option, social-essentialities help explain social-
essentialist facts. Because we are granting Embedded*, it follows that 
worldly social-essentialities help explain social-essentialist facts. It is 
plausible, however, that if a worldly fact helps explain another fact, 
then that fact must also be worldly (Raven 2021a). This implies that 
the social-essentialist facts must be worldly if worldly social-
essentialities help explain them. And that implies Embedded.  
 On the second option, social-essentialist facts help explain 
social-essentialities. Because we are granting Embedded*, it follows 
that social-essentialist facts help explain worldly social-essentialities. 
Their worldliness may seem to imply the worldliness of the social-
essentialist facts that help explain them. To illustrate, if we ask why 
social-essentialities like E1-E3 are worldly, we may cite their concern 
with worldly matters such as Congress and bicamerality, women 
and oppression, the Koreas and fortifications. While social-
essentialist facts like S1-S3 concern essence, they also concern 
Congress and bicamerality, women and oppression, the Koreas and 
fortifications. This suggests that social-essentialist facts must be 
worldly if the social-essentialities they help explain are worldly. And 
that implies Embedded.  
 These considerations suggest that the proposed solution may 
conceal a covert commitment to the very claim, Embedded, it aims to 
reject. Still, the proposed solution seems appealing (especially when 
combined with the second option). Indeed, the solution I will sketch 
in section 5 may be regarded as a more precise development of it. 
But the development relies on drawing distinctions yet to be drawn. 
So it would be premature to declare Embedded false and the puzzle 
solved. For now, the initial support for Embedded still stands.  
 Detached 
There is a strong initial pull toward regarding essentialist facts as 
unworldly. The pull derives its strength from general considerations 
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about essence’s roles in inquiry. One role is to fix the domain. We may 
clarify this by contrasting it with an alternative conception of essence 
on which it does not fix the domain but sorts it. Dasgupta (2016: p. 
388) characterizes the domain-sorting conception like this:  
...one starts with the idea that there are two ways to have a 
property—an essential way and an accidental way—and one then 
takes the essentialist facts about something to be facts concerning 
which properties it has in the essential way. On this picture the 
essentialist facts are facts concerning which properties are had in 
that way by a given domain of things.  
The domain is given. So it is not fixed by essence. Instead, essence 
sorts the domain. This contrasts with the domain-fixing conception 
also characterized by Dasgupta (2016: p. 389):  
...the essentialist facts concern what those things are in the first 
place. It is not that there is some independently given domain and 
the essentialist facts are certain facts about what properties they 
have. It is rather that the essentialist facts specify what the domain 
is in the first place.  
Essentialist facts fix the domain. That is perhaps essence’s primary 
role. It is perhaps only secondary that essentialities or essentialist 
facts express properties essential to items in the domain. 
The domain-fixing conception comports well with the 
unworldliness of essentialist facts. To see why, consider how Fine 
(2005: p. 349) characterizes the domain-fixing conception:  
The objects enter the world with their identity predetermined, as 
it were; and there is nothing in how things are that can have any 
bearing on what they are. 
The link to unworldliness is even more explicit when Fine (2005: pp. 
348-49) writes:  
...the identity of an object is independent of how things turn 
out...it is the core essential features of the object that will be 
independent of how things turn out and they will be independent 
in the sense of holding regardless of the circumstances, not whatever 
the circumstances. 
Essentialist facts determine the identities of objects. That is how they 
fix the domain. But then it seems they cannot hold because of 
anything in the domain. And that may seem to prevent them from 
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holding in virtue of any worldly circumstances at all. Instead, it may 
seem as if the essentialist facts would have to somehow obtain 
without regard to the worldly circumstances. Perhaps there is a way 
to accommodate the domain-fixing conception within the 
Aristotelian tradition. But it is not altogether clear how this might be 
done (Raven 2021b). So the unworldliness of essentialist facts might 
seem to be an inevitable consequence of the domain-fixing 
conception.   
Detaching essences from the world makes them like Plato’s 
Forms. To the extent they are alike, criticisms of the latter may 
transfer to the former. For example, in Parmenides, it is worried that 
Forms proliferate to include such “undignified” items as hair, mud, 
and dirt. The notorious difficulties interpreting this worry obscure 
how probative it is. Even so, the worry is suggestive of more 
pertinent worries.   
 One worry focuses on the proliferation of essences. If essences 
are detached from the world, then it seems nothing in the world 
could limit which essences there are. The absence of any limit 
suggests a proliferation of essences. It’s as if all the essences there 
could be are already out there in a Platonic realm waiting for their 
chance at instantiation. While some may accept this proliferation 
(Yablo 1987; Leslie 2011; Inman 2014), others find it objectionable. 
Another worry focuses on the detachedness of essences. Some 
essences may indeed seem somehow “prior” to the worldly 
circumstances. But others do not. In particular, social essences may 
seem to depend upon the worldly circumstances precisely because 
they are social. It may then seem objectionable, or perhaps even 
incoherent, to regard social essences as detached.  
 The objection’s force can be exaggerated by neglecting the 
status/report distinction. Recall that the essentialist facts E1-E3 have 
the status of being essential while the essentialities S1-S3 report this 
status. Confusing them may tempt one to reject Detached for bad 
reasons. Consider whether Congress is bicameral, or women are 
oppressed as women, or whether the Korean DMZ is unfortified. 
These may seem to be purely worldly matters. One might conclude 
that Detached is false, if one confusedly took it to concern 
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essentialities like E1-E3. But it does not. Instead, Detached concerns 
essentialist facts like S1-S3. And it may not seem to be a purely 
worldly matter whether Congress is essentially bicameral, or women 
are essentially oppressed as women, or the Korean DMZ is essentially 
unfortified. Respecting the status/report distinction allows E1-E3 to 
be worldly without thereby implying that S1-S3 are also worldly.  
 These last considerations are somewhat in tension with the 
considerations that concluded the previous section. There it was 
suggested that social-essentialist facts like S1-S3 must be worldly if 
the social-essentialities like E1-E3 that they help explain are worldly. 
The tension, however, is a manifestation of our puzzle. We have 
competing inclinations to regard essences as at once embedded and 
detached. I have argued that the tension between these inclinations 
won’t be alleviated by blithely dismissing either of them. Instead, a 
satisfying solution must respect the initial support for the claims 
generating the puzzle even if that support is ultimately revealed as 
illusory. For now, the initial support for Detached still stands.     
 Toward a solution 
I have argued for each of the claims generating the puzzle. My aim 
was not to establish their truth but to support their plausibility. That 
shows that the puzzle is, indeed, puzzling. I wish to conclude by 
outlining a potential solution. The solution alleges that the puzzle 
relies on an illicit equivocation. What’s novel about this solution is 
the specific distinction that it takes to be equivocated.  
 The distinction concerns how the basal status of a fact is 
determined. We may illustrate this by a familiar example. Recall:  
ES   Socrates is essentially a member of {Socrates}. 
On the one hand, the determination of ES may be regarded as a 
proximal matter. It only concerns whether Socrates is essentially a 
member of {Socrates}, and has nothing to do with the ultimate source 
of this set-theoretic fact. It is, if I may put it this way, already written 
into the identity of the set that it has this member, and nothing in the 
22/31 
worldly circumstances is relevant to whether this is so. On the other 
hand, the determination of ES may be regarded as a distal matter. It 
is not merely a matter of whether Socrates is essentially a member of 
his singleton, but also a matter of what explains, or grounds, this fact. 
For all that’s been said, the explanation may turn out to be either 
worldly (e.g. the fact is constructed by mathematicians’ mental acts 
or practices) or unworldly (e.g. the fact obtains in virtue of a Platonic 
realm).  
 The example illustrates how the determination of a fact may 
be proximal or distal. When a fact obtains, it will or will not concern 
the circumstances. This is a matter of the fact’s proximal basal status. 
But this needn’t engage with what, if anything, ultimately explains, 
or grounds, the fact (Raven 2015,2020b). Its grounds, if any, will or 
will not concern the circumstances. And that is a matter of the fact’s 
distal basal status. In general, a fact’s proximal basal status does not 
involve the basal statuses of any other facts, whereas its distal basal 
status does.  
 The proximal/distal distinction enables a potential solution to 
the puzzle. The solution relies on the possible divergence of a fact’s 
proximal and distal basal statuses. But the solution’s viability 
requires refining the basal distinction. While I have done so 
elsewhere (Raven 2021a), our purposes here do not require repeating 
the details. Instead, I will tailor the key points to the present context.   
 What makes the proximal basal status of a fact proximal is its 
intrinsic determination by that fact itself regardless of any others. 
The idea is vividly illustrated by atomic facts. Let an atomic fact A be 
the application of an n-place property P to items x1,…,xn. We may then 
ask whether the instantiation of P by x1,…,xn is worldly or unworldly. 
Our answer determines atomic fact A’s proximal basal status:  
Proximal-atomic   For any atomic fact A = Px1,...,xn: 
 A is proximally worldly =df. P’s application to x1,...,xn is 
worldly.    
 A is proximally unworldly =df. A is not proximally worldly.   
To illustrate, if we take I1 to be an atomic fact applying the property 
of having 535 voting members to Congress, then it is proximally 
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worldly because it is a worldly matter that Congress has 535 voting 
members. And if we take E1 to be an atomic fact applying the 
property of bicamerality to Congress, then it is proximally 
unworldly because it is an unworldly matter that Congress is 
bicameral. In this way, the proximal (un)worldliness of an atomic 
fact is determined proximally by the (un)worldliness of the 
instantiation of its constituent property. 
 The question then arises of how to extend our notion of 
proximal basal status to complex facts. Answering this requires 
addressing what sorts of complexity, or structure, a complex fact 
may have. Will it include truth-functional complexity, allowing for 
conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative facts? Will it include 
quantificational complexity, allowing for existentially or universally 
general facts? Will there be other sorts of complexity too? The issues 
are rather delicate. A comprehensive treatment of them would take 
us too far afield. But we may still give a penultimate gloss of the 
extension, while reserving the right to iron out the wrinkles later. 
 The guiding idea is that worldliness is “dominant” while 
unworldliness is “recessive” (Fine 2018; Raven 2021a). This means 
that all it takes for a complex fact to be worldly is for it to have a 
worldly constituent. By contrast, a complex fact is unworldly only if 
all its constituents are unworldly. The guiding idea does not depend 
on the exact details of what a complex fact’s constituents are. So it 
can guide the extension of proximal basal status to complex facts in 
abstraction from what their constituents are taken to be: 
Proximal-complex  For any complex fact C: 
 C is proximally worldly =df. some constituent of C is 
proximally worldly.    
 C is proximally unworldly =df. C is not proximally worldly.   
We therefore arrive at a compositional characterization of proximal 
basal status by combining Proximal-atomic and Proximal-complex. 
Although the characterization should not be taken as the last word 
on the subject, it should suffice for our purposes.  
 Next, we consider notions of distal basal status. What makes 
them distal is their extrinsic determination by the basal statuses of 
24/31 
other facts. There are many ways these other facts may exert their 
influence. And so there is an intricate web of distal basal notions that 
can be defined. But since most of them are not pertinent here, I defer 
discussing them to another occasion (Raven 2021a). My focus here 
will be only on the most pertinent distal basal notions.  
 The distal basal status of a fact is determined partly by the 
proximal basal statuses of other facts, such as its grounds. We assume 
that ground obeys a “cut” principle that requires it to chain. We then 
define an auxiliary hereditary notion that includes all of a fact’s 
grounds:  
Hereditary For any fact F: 
 F is hereditarily worldly =df. F and all its partial grounds 
are proximally worldly. 
 F is hereditarily unworldly =df. F and all its partial grounds 
are proximally unworldly.   
The hereditary basal status of an ungrounded fact collapses into its 
proximal basal status. The proximal and distal basal statuses of a fact 
cannot diverge if it is hereditarily (un)worldly.  
 But a less extreme distal notion allows for divergence by only 
requiring the existence of some hereditarily (un)worldly ground:  
Distal     For any fact F:  
 F is distally worldly =df. for some full ground G1,… of F, 
each of G1,…  is hereditarily worldly. 
 F is distally unworldly =df. S is not distally worldly.   
These distal notions follow our proximal notions in regarding 
worldliness as dominant. Other distal notions could also be defined. 
Our present concern, however, is not with these other notions and 
they are discussed elsewhere (Raven 2021a).  
 We may illustrate the possibility of divergence with our 
earlier example, the fact ES. Presumably, the instantiation of the 
member of relation by Socrates and {Socrates} is unworldly. (If this is 
doubted, we can switch examples: the instantiation of the member of 
relation by 0 and {0} is unworldly.) If so, then Proximal-atomic implies 
that ES is proximally unworldly. But it may also be supposed that 
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set-theoretic facts are grounded in facts about mathematicians’ 
mental acts or practices. And it may be further supposed that these 
facts are proximally worldly. If so, then Distal implies that ES is 
distally worldly. This illustrates how a fact can be proximally 
unworldly but distally worldly.  
 The possibility of divergence between proximal and distal 
basal statuses helps resolve the puzzle in two stages. The first stage 
argues that the puzzle rests on a fallacy of equivocation or a false 
claim. Recall the claims generating the puzzle:  
Social-Essentialism  There are social-essentialist facts. 
Embedded    Social-essentialist facts are worldly. 
Detached     Essentialist facts are unworldly. 
We did not distinguish between proximal/distal basal status before. 
Now that we do, does it affect these claims? It does not affect Social-
Essentialism because it does not even mention basal statuses. But both 
Embedded and Detached do. They do not, however, specify whether 
the basal status is proximal or distal. They are ambiguous between 
them. One disambiguation has them be about proximal basal statuses:  
Embedded-proximal Social-essentialist facts are proximally 
worldly. 
Detached-proximal  Essentialist facts are proximally 
unworldly. 
Another disambiguation has them be about distal basal statuses:   
Embedded-distal   Social-essentialist facts are distally 
worldly. 
Detached-distal   Essentialist facts are distally unworldly. 
The claims must be disambiguated uniformly to avoid the fallacy of 
equivocation. But the puzzle cannot arise either way. This is because 
either way will falsify some claim. However Detached is 
disambiguated, it will imply that essentialist facts are unworldly in 
the relevant sense. Because social-essentialist facts are essentialist 
facts, they too will be unworldly in that sense. And so, on any 
disambiguation, Embedded is false if Detached is true. 
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Disambiguating uniformly thus guarantees that some claim will be 
false. So the puzzle cannot arise.  
 Although the first stage explains why the puzzle cannot arise, 
it does not explain why it appeared as if it could. The second stage 
explains this. The quick explanation is that any allure the puzzle 
appeared to have relied on equivocating over the proximal/distal 
distinction. This can be bolstered by a fuller explanation of why some 
of the disambiguated claims seem true even though they cannot 
together generate the puzzle. The explanation might take various 
forms, and a comprehensive discussion of them is beyond the scope 
of this paper. So I will focus on sketching one form of explanation 
that interprets detachedness proximally and embeddedness distally.  
 To interpret detachedness proximally is to regard essence’s 
domain-fixing role as proximal. This role takes an essentialist fact to 
help fix what its subject is. Thus, the essentialist facts S1-S3 help fix 
what Congress is, what women are, and what the Korean DMZ is. 
None of this seems to turn on the worldly circumstances. Of course, 
one might still ask what, if anything, explains why these essentialist 
facts obtain. But how one answers does not seem relevant to their 
role in fixing what their subjects are. These considerations suggest 
that the detachedness of an essentialist fact is a proximal matter 
unconcerned with its grounds. That suggests that detachedness 
concerns proximal basal status. And that supports Detached-proximal.  
 To interpret embeddedness distally is to regard the source of 
social essences to be distal. This relies on distinguishing between the 
role of essences and their ultimate sources. Even if it is then assumed 
that essences play a domain-fixing role, this won’t determine what 
their ultimate source is. That, presumably, is determined distally by 
what, if anything, grounds the essentialist facts. But the grounds of 
essentialist facts are precisely what determines their distal basal 
status. And that supports Embedded-distal. 
 In sum, our solution alleges that our puzzle equivocates the 
proximal/distal distinction. On the proper disambiguations, 
Detached says that essentialist facts are proximally unworldly 
whereas Embedded says that social-essentialist facts are distally 
worldly. Given Social-Essentialism, social-essentialist facts are 
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proximally unworldly but distally worldly. These statuses are 
compatible. So contradiction is avoided. 
This, of course, is only the beginnings of a complete solution. 
A proper defense of both stages is still needed. In particular, we will 
want fuller accounts of the proximal unworldliness of essentialist 
facts and of the distal worldliness of social-essentialist facts. And it 
may be challenging to provide such accounts (Raven 2021b). But 
now at least there is a path laid out before us toward a solution to 
our puzzle.   
 The path seems to lead to a reconciliation of a conflict in our 
thought about social essences. Our puzzle derived from our 
competing inclinations to regard social essences as at once detached 
from while embedded in the world. A proper defense of the solution 
just sketched, however, promises to vindicate the kernels of truth in 
each of these competing inclinations.  
 The path may also lead to a more general reconciliation of the 
Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. With the Platonist, essences may 
help fix their subject matter without regard to the circumstances. 
With the Aristotelian, essences, and social essences in particular, 
may nevertheless have their ultimate source in the worldly 
circumstances. It’s understandable why these two traditions may at 
first seem to conflict. But our apparatus suggests how they might not 
conflict after all.   
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